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- Following the partition of India in 1947, the greatest source of
tension between the new states of India and Pakistan was to be the future
of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Shortly after partition, fear
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was expressed that "the problem [of Kashmir] may well drag on for
several years before a definitive solution is reached."' Indeed, after
nearly fifty years and three Indo-Pakistani wars, the Kashmir problem
still exists and may once more lead to hostilities in the region.
There is no doubt that the roots of the conflict existed in British
India prior to 1947, but there can also be no doubt that the direct trigger
of the overt conflict was the manner by which the subcontinent was
partitioned following the end of the Raj. This article will assert that
conflict between India and Pakistan was not inevitable, but was triggered
by the failure of Britain to make adequate provisions for the post-
colonial order, particularly with regard to the future of the princely
states. This article will further argue that although the legal claims to
Kashmir put forth by both India and Pakistan since the partition have
validity, they have been diluted by politics and the lack of international
will to such an extent that they have lost much of their relevance.
However, each party's insistence on the legitimacy of its own arguments
and intervening unilateral actions has created a stalemate in which
neither has been willing or politically able to concede any ground. The
conflict is now entrenched to such an extent that a strict legalistic
approach is no longer workable and must be abandoned in favor of a
more equitable approach to conflict resolution.
Part II of this article discusses the genesis of the Kashmir conflict,
examining the historical background of British India, the circumstances
surrounding its partition, and the accession of Kashmir to India. Part III
traces the subsequent events that led to stalemate between India and
Pakistan. Part IV analyzes the effects of subsequent actions by India,
Pakistan, and the international community on the Kashmir issue. Part V
examines the extent to which the conflict has become entrenched and
proposes a new approach to the issue.
II. Historical Background of the Interstate Conflict
A. British India and the Partition
British rule in India began in the early nineteenth century with the
assumption of governmental powers by the East India Company.2 The
Crown assumed direct control in 1858, and India was administered as
nine provinces, which composed "British India," and whose affairs were
1. Pitman B. Potter, The Principal Legal and Political Problems Involved in the
Kashmir Case, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1950).
2. The Company was vested with this power by the Charter Act of 1833. Ali Khan,
The Kashmir Dispute: A Plan for Regional Cooperation, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
495, 504 (1994).
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fully managed by the British.3  Under the doctrine of paramountcy,
Britain also held responsibility for the defense and foreign relations of
584 princely states, which retained a great deal of autonomy in all other
affairs.4
By the end of World War II, it became clear that Indian
independence would be forthcoming. The form that independent India
would take, however, was uncertain. The majority Indian National
Congress advocated a unified, secular, multiethnic democracy.5 The All-
India Muslim League, on the other hand, favored a "two-nation" theory,
asserting that Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate nations.
6
Under this plan, demanded by League leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the
former British India would be divided into two states, one primarily
Muslim and one primarily Hindu.7
The two-nation theory was a manifestation of Muslim apprehension
at the idea of a unified independent India in which the Hindu population
would constitute a significant majority. That the Congress, under the
leadership of Jawharlal Nehru and in the tradition of Mahondas Gandhi,
sincerely believed in the idea of a unified India based on equality is not
suspect. However, communal conflict and religious differences, nurtured
by the Raj in order to maintain authority, could not be overcome.8 Thus,
the British Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, which advocated the "one-
nation" theory of a confederated, unified India, was abandoned.9
Instead, the two-nation theory was adopted, and plans were made
for the expedited partition of British India. The resulting Indian
Independence Act was characterized as failing to provide for the division
of finances, the military, foreign affairs, infrastructure, and numerous
other complex matters.' 0 Nonetheless, the provinces of British India
were hastily partitioned on August 15, 1947, creating the Dominion of
3. Id.
4. Damodar R. SarDesai, The Origins of Kashmir's International and Legal Status,
in PERSPECTIVES ON KASHMIR: THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN SOUTH ASIA 81 (Raju G.C.
Thomas, ed. 1992). It is explained that the favorable treatment afforded to the princely
states was in part due to their support of the British during the Indian Army's mutiny of
1847. Khan, supra note 2, at 504.
5. Douglas C. Makeig, War, No- War, and the India-Pakistan Negotiating Process,
60 PAC. AFF. 271, 278 (1987).
6. Raju G.C. Thomas, Reflections on the Kashmir Problem, in PERSPECTIVES ON
KASHMIR, supra note 4, at 11-12.
7. SarDesai, supra note 4, at 81.
8. IAN TALBOT, INDIA & PAKISTAN 21 (2000) (describing the use of ethnic tensions
as a tool of the government).
9. Javaid Rehman, Reviewing the Right of Self-Determination: Lessons from the
Experience of the Indian Sub-Continent, 29 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 454, 462 (2000).
10. James Howley, Alive and Kicking: The Kashmir Dispute Forty Years Later, 9
DICK. J. INT'L L. 87, 87 (1991).
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India and the Dominion of Pakistan. " I
The consequences of the partition were unimaginable.
Approximately seven million Muslims migrated from the new Dominion
of India into Pakistan, and approximately 5.5 million people migrated in
the opposite direction. 12 It is estimated that as many as one million
people were killed as a result of violence that occurred immediately
following partition.'
3
The partition also had consequences for the national psyche of both
dominions that would affect future relations between them. India viewed
Pakistan as an illegitimate state carved out of the territory of the
multiethnic, "traditional" India that encompassed the entire subcontinent.
Meanwhile, Pakistan saw India as a threat to its very existence, bent on
reclaiming the new state and subjugating the Muslim minority. These
views would not only impact relations between India and Pakistan, but
would also be the driving force behind many of their third-party
relations.
The princely states, although certainly impacted by the partition,
were not incorporated into either dominion. Rather, the Indian
Independence Act provided that the Crown's paramountcy lapsed and all
powers returned to the individual states.' 4  The effect of the Act, as
understood by Britain and Pakistan, was that individual rulers would
have the authority to determine their own state's future, while the Indian
view was that these states were anomalies created from the territory of
the greater nation and should be reincorporated.15 In any event, without
British forces available for their defense, independence was not a real
option for the princely states, many of which were quite small. 16 The
states were encouraged by then-Viceroy Lord Mountbatten to accede to
one dominion or the other.'
7
Hence, almost all of the princely states acceded to become part of
either Pakistan or India, generally depending on geography.' 8 Prior to
11. Id. The Dominion of Pakistan consisted of two geographically separate halves:
West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) and East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). A
thousand miles of Indian territory separated the two parts of the dominion.
12. TALBOT, supra note 8, at 157.
13. Id.
14. Khan, supra note 2, at 505. See generally Indian Independence Act, 1947, §
7(1)(b).
15. Khan, supra note 2, at 506. Nehru declared that India would never recognize
"the right of Indian States to continue as feudal and autocratic monarchies." ld. (quoting
Nehru's 1935 presidential address).
16. SarDesai, supra note 4, at 83.
17. Thomas, supra note 6, at 19.
18. The British administration recommended that states with a majority Hindu
population accede to India. Those with a majority Muslim population should accede to
Pakistan, but only if the Muslim-majority state was contiguous to the territory of
[Vol. 21:2
2002] THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 297
partition, over 500 accessions were accepted by the incoming Indian and
Pakistani governments.' 9 It is important to note that these accessions
were effected by the ruler of the state simply executing an instrument of
accession. 20 However, three major princely states, including the state of
Jammu and Kashmir [hereinafter referred to as "Kashmir"] declined to
accede to either dominion prior to partition.
B. Kashmir's Status and the Accession
Kashmir, the largest of the princely states, held a strategic
geographic position between the new dominions, and also bordered
China and the Soviet Union. In 1947, Kashmir was 80% Muslim,
although Buddhists and Hindus constituted majorities in two of the
state's five regions. 2 1 Geographically and economically, Kashmir was
viewed as being closely tied to the territory that would become
Pakistan.22 Its main connections to the outside world were the Indus
River and the Srinagar-Rawalpindi Road, both of which linked it to
Pakistan.23 Given these natural ties, Kashmir's accession to Pakistan
would have been logical.
The princely ruler of Kashmir, however, was Maharaja Hari Singh,
a Hindu.2 4 Opposed to the idea of joining Pakistan, the Maharaja was
equally reluctant to accede to India for fear of losing political power.25
The Maharaja therefore entered into a Standstill Agreement with the new
Pakistani government in August 1947 whereby Pakistan would
administer the operation of communication and railroad services in
Kashmir.2 6 There is evidence that the Maharaja still considered the
Pakistan. Id.
19. SarDesai, supra note 4, at 82.
20. Id. It is significant that over 500 accessions were accepted as legally binding by
the British, Indian, and Pakistani officials once signed by the ruler without requirement of
a plebiscite or ratification. Id.
21. The religious compositions of the five regions were as follows: the regions of
Vale of Kashmir and Poonch both held Muslim majorities of at least 90%; the Gilgit
region also contained a Muslim majority; the Jammu region was 59% Hindu; and the
region of Ladakh and Baltistan was predominantly Buddhist. Howley, supra note 10, at
88.
22. Potter, supra note 1, at 363.
23. Howley, supra note 10, at 88.
24. Shahid Javed Burki, PAKISTAN: THE CONTINUING SEARCH FOR NATIONHOOD 191
(1991). Kashmir was ceded by the British to Gublab Singh and his heirs under the 1846
Treaty of Amritsar in exchange for a sum of money. Riyaz Punjabi, Kashmir: The
Bruised Identity, in PERSPECTIVES ON KASHMIR, supra note 4, at 132.
25. SarDesai, supra note 4, at 83 (describing the Maharaja's fear of dominance by
the National Conference of Kashmir, which was closely linked to Nehru's Congress
Party).
26. Howley, supra note 10, at 89.
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option of an independent Kashmir at that time.27
The idea of independence did not last, though, as the state began
experiencing unrest. A Muslim revolt in the Poonch region and
subsequent inter-communal violence resulted in the invasion of Kashmir
by Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan on October 22, 1947.28 At the same
time, Kashmir accused the Pakistani government of severing lines of
supply into Kashmir.29  Eager to maintain his hold on power, the
Maharaja turned to India for help.
On October 26, the Maharaja appealed to the Governor-General of
India, Lord Mountbatten, for military intervention, and on the same day
executed the Instrument of Accession. 30 The following day, Mountbatten
formally accepted the accession, declaring in writing, "I hereby accept
this Instrument of Accession." 31  Mountbatten also replied to the
Maharaja in a personal letter, stating that:
[M]y Government has decided to accept the accession of Kashmir
State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy that, in
the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the
subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in
accordance with the wishes of the people of the State. It is my
Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored
in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the
State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.
3 2
Indian troops were quickly dispatched to Kashmir and regained control
of all but the border areas of the state.
III. Creation of the Stalemate
A. United Nations Involvement
Kashmir's accession to India was soon complicated by the parties'
unilateral actions and the involvement of the international community.
Just months after assuming British India's position in the United Nations,
27. BURKi, supra note 24, 191. It has been speculated that both China and the
U.S.S.R. would have viewed Kashmiri independence as favorable to their own interests.
Id. It is also asserted that the Maharaja had already made plans to accede to India, and
that evidence exists to support this claim. See Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan, India,
and Kashmir: A Historical Review, in PERSPECTIVES ON KASHMIR, supra note 4, at 96-97.
28. Howley, supra note 10, at 89-90. The violence resulted in the massacres of over
200,000 Muslims.
29. SarDesai, supra note 4, at 84.
30. Id.
31. Howley, supra note 10, at 94.
32. Letter from Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Hari Singh (Oct. 27, 1947), in
CHRISTOPHER B. BIRDWOOD, Two NATIONS AND KASHMIR 207 (1956).
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India brought the issue of Pakistani interference in Kashmir before the
U.N. Security Council on January 1, 1948.33 Pursuant to Article 35 of
the U.N. Charter, India alleged that Pakistan had assisted in the invasion
of Kashmir by providing military equipment, training and supplies to the
Pathan warriors.34
Denying any participation in the invasion, Pakistan leveled counter-
charges, accusing India of involvement in the massacres of Muslims in
Kashmir, aggression against Pakistan, and questioning the validity of the
Maharaja's accession to India.35 Pakistan requested that the Security
Council appoint a commission to secure a cease-fire, ensure withdrawal
of outside forces, and conduct a plebiscite to determine Kashmir's
future.36 Without addressing the original complaint lodged by India, the
Security Council adopted a resolution establishing the United Nations
Commission on India and Pakistan [UNCIP].37 The stated purpose of the
Commission was to make findings of fact pursuant to Article 34 and to
act as a mediating influence.38
Shortly thereafter, the Security Council adopted another resolution,
this time voicing its support for Kashmiri self-determination and
recognizing the need for a plebiscite. 39  The plebiscite would be
conducted under the supervision of an administrator appointed by the
U.N. Secretary General and certified as fair by UNCIP. 40 The resolution
also called for withdrawal of armed Pakistani tribesmen and a reduction
41
of Indian forces to the minimum necessary.
Both parties balked at the terms of the resolution, fearing that the
other party would gain a strategic advantage. The situation was
complicated by the revelation that regular Pakistani troops were already
inside the borders of Kashmir and that the tribal invasion and Indian
intervention had evolved into a state of war between India and Pakistan
by the time UNCIP arrived. Upon its arrival in Karachi on July 7, 1948,
the Commission was informed by Pakistan's foreign minister that three
brigades had already been deployed in clear disregard of the Security
42Council's resolutions, and contradictory to Pakistan's own statements.
33. SarDesai, supra note 4, at 85.
34. Letter from the Representative of India to the President of the Security Council
(Jan 1, 1948), U.N. Doc. S/628 (1948). In its complaint, India indicated that it would
resolve the accession issue once conditions in Kashmir allowed. Id.
35. Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the Secretary General
(Jan. 15, 1948), U.N. Doc. S/646/Corr. 1 (1948).
36. Id.
37. S.C. Res. 39, U.N. Doc. S/654 (1948).
38. Id.
39. S.C. Res. 47, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 286th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/726 (1948).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Josef Korbel, The Kashmir Dispute and the United Nations, 3 INT'L ORG. 278,
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVEW
The Pakistani forces were stationed in support of the tribesmen, now
assembled as the Azad Kashmir movement, and fighting continued.
On August 13, 1948, UNCIP adopted a significant resolution, which
contained a three part proposed agreement. Part I called for a cease-fire
between the opposing forces.4 3 Part II required Pakistan to withdraw its
troops and use its best efforts to secure the withdrawal of armed
tribesmen, and provided that the evacuated territory would be
administered by local authorities. 4 Upon withdrawal of Pakistani forces
and tribesmen, India was to withdraw the bulk of its forces.4 5 Finally,
Part III restated the principle that the future of Kashmir should be
determined by a vote of its people.46
A cease-fire was negotiated and signed on January 1, 1949 .
Shortly thereafter, the Commission clarified the August 13 resolution,
stating that the issue of Kashmir's accession should be determined by a
plebiscite after the requirements of Parts I and II of the resolution were
fulfilled.48 The proposals contained in the August 13 resolution were
eventually accepted by India and Pakistan; however, Pakistan placed
such conditions on its acceptance that UNCIP was forced to consider it
"tantamount to rejection. ' 49 In any event, no withdrawal of Pakistani
forces or tribesmen occurred, although later that same year, a cease-fire
line was agreed upon,50 and a U.N. Military Observer Group was
eventually dispatched to supervise the line.
51
Despite its efforts, the Commission was disbanded in favor of
individual U.N. Representatives. From 1949 until 1953, these
Representatives worked to negotiate a plebiscite in Kashmir but with no
success.53  The U.N. remained active in the Kashmir issue for many
years, and the Security Council frequently renewed its call for a
280 (1949). Korbel, from Czechoslovakia, was one of the members of the Commission.
43. Resolution for a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement Adopted by the United
Nations Commission on Indian and Pakistan, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc.
S/995 (1948).
44. Id. at 3-5.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Khan, supra note 2, at 515.
48. Resolution of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan, U.N.
SCOR, 4th Sess., 399th Mtg. at 4-7, U.N. Doc. S/1196 (1949).
49. Korbel, supra note 42, at 282-83.
50. Agreement Between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding
the Establishment of a Cease-fire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, July 27, 1949,
India-Pak., 81 U.N.T.S. 273.
51. See S.C. Res. 91, U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess., 539th Mtg., U.N. Doc S/2017/Rev.1
(1951).
52. See S.C. Res. 80, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 470th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1469 (1950).
53. SarDesai, supra note 4, at 89. Among the Representatives were General A.G.L.
McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Dr. Frank Graham. Id.
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The new Indian Constitution specifically dealt with the Kashmir
issue. Article 370 limited the authority of the Indian National Parliament
to pass legislation for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, granting some
degree of autonomy to the state.55 It also created a State Constituent
Assembly that would frame the constitution of the state and adopt
legislation.56 No modification of Article 370 could be made without the
concurrence of this Constituent Assembly.
57
A Constituent Assembly was subsequently convened and a state
constitution was adopted in 1956.58 This Constitution reaffirmed the
Maharaja's accession and provided that the state was an integral part of
India.59 In addition, it confirmed that the state consisted of all territory
under the sovereignty of the Maharaja on the date of the partition.60 By
doing so, the Constitution claimed all territory occupied by Pakistan to
be a part of the state.
India suffered great criticism for the manner in which the
Constituent Assembly was established. The Assembly was viewed as a
means of legitimizing Indian control over Kashmir while avoiding a
plebiscite on the question of accession. India would, it was speculated,
ensure the victory of Sheik Abdullah's All Jammu and Kashmir National
Conference. Thus, the election of its Assembly members in 1951 was
boycotted by the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, resulting
in National Conference candidates being declared victorious without any
balloting.6' The election was labeled a farce by Pakistan,62 and the
Security Council declared that action by the Assembly would not satisfy
its call for a plebiscite.63
In 1953, three years prior to adoption of the state constitution, the
54. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 91, U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess., 539th Mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/2017/Rev.1 (1951); S.C. Res. 96, U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess., 566th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2392
(1951); S.C. Res. 98, U.N. SCOR, 7th Sess., 611th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2883 (1952); S.C.
Res. 122, U.N. SCOR, 12th Sess., 765th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/3779 (1957); S.C. Res. 126,
U.N. SCOR, 12th Sess., 808th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/3922 (1957).
55. INDIA CONST. art. 370.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Khan, supra note 2, at 518.
59. JAMMU AND KASHMIR CONST. § 3. No amendments to this section are permitted
under the constitution.
60. Id. § 4.
61. Khan, supra note 2, at 517.
62. Id.
63. S.C. Res. 91, U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess., 539th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2017/Rev.1
(1951).
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVEW
Working Group of the National Conference considered several
alternatives for Kashmir's future. After deliberations, the committee
unanimously decided that Kashmir should opt for independence, with
joint Indo-Pakistani control over foreign affairs.64 Sheikh Abdullah was
promptly dismissed by Indian authorities and arrested.65 The creation of
the Assembly was viewed by many as a means of foregoing a true
opportunity for Kashmiri self-determination. This interpretation is
somewhat suspect, as India still appeared willing to consider a plebiscite.
That willingness, however, evaporated in mid-1954, due to Pakistan's
foreign relations, as discussed in the next section.
From that time on, the autonomy granted by Article 370 was slowly
abrogated. Many constitutional provisions previously not applicable to
Kashmir were made applicable by amendment of Article 370, with
approval of the Constituent Assembly. The powers of the Indian




Despite India's actions in creating the Constituent Assembly, its
leaders did not appear to be excluding the possibility of negotiations with
Pakistan regarding Kashmir. It is clear that Prime Minister Nehru was
truly committed to a pacific resolution of the dispute. After the dismissal
of Abdullah, it seems that Nehru reconsidered his position. In 1953,
Nehru met with Pakistan's leader, Mohammed Ali Bogra, and offered to
agree to Pakistan's long-standing demand: a plebiscite for Kashmir in its
entirety.68 Significantly, Nehru's offer "was not made under any external
or internal pressure, but from a genuine conviction that India must not
hold Kashmir against the wishes of its people. 69
Pakistan, however, failed to seize this opportunity. Although the
world will never know with certainty, it is speculated that this inaction
resulted from the ambitions of Pakistan's military leaders, among them
future ruler Ayub Khan. 70 Khan desired to maintain a state of conflict
with India in order to support his military role and facilitate his seizure of
64. Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, Nation Identity and the Intervening Role of the
State: A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir, 69 PAC. AFF. 471, 483 (1996).
65. Id.
66. INDIA CONST. arts. 356 and 357.
67. Id. arts. 248, 249, 250.
68. Gowher Rizvi, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Problem, 1947 - 1972, in
PERSPECTIVES ON KASHMIR, supra note 4, at 58.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 59.
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power as the Muslim League crumbled.71
What made Nehru's offer truly a golden moment was the fact that
Pakistan was about to depart on a course of international diplomacy that
would eventually divide the two countries even further. Unable to
complete his self-serving military build-up alone, Khan turned to foreign
countries. In the post-war years, the United States, obsessed with the
containment of communism, preferred the idea of alliance with India.
However, India's policy of cold war neutrality and commitment to the
nonaligned movement was a thorn in the American side. Thus, Pakistan
entered into negotiations with the U.S.
India resented the introduction of external power into the
subcontinent and warned Pakistan of the consequences of its actions.
Nehru clearly indicated that military partnership with the U.S. would
damage Indo-Pakistani relations and cause withdrawal of the plebiscite
offer.72 Nevertheless, Pakistan entered into a mutual assistance pact with
the U.S. in 1954. 73 Although technically use of the U.S. supplied arms
was limited to defense against communism, this use was perceived by
India as a direct threat. In addition to the increased military threat from
Pakistan, India perceived the pact as pressure from the U.S. to abandon
its nonaligned policy. The offer of a plebiscite for Kashmir was
promptly taken off the table and whatever goodwill had developed
quickly evaporated.
D. Bilateralism
India and Pakistan engaged in two more wars in the second half of
the twentieth century. The first, in 1965, resulted from the infiltration of
thousands of Pakistani-supported armed freedom fighters, known as
mujahideen, from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir. Their purpose was
to incite a popular uprising in Kashmir against Indian rule. The uprising
did not materialize, however, and once it was established that the
incursion had been engineered in Pakistan, India declared war. The
seventeen-day war essentially resulted in a stalemate.
74
The Security Council's attempts to end the 1965 war were
71. Id.
72. Id. at 60.
73. This pact was reinforced by Pakistan's subsequent entry into the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).
74. BURKI, supra note 24, at 192. It has been observed that the Pakistani
government "proceeded under the naive assumption that India would somehow respect
the difference between the cease-fire line in Kashmir and the international border
between the two countries. Whereas the mujahideen could cross the cease-fire line,
Indian armed forces were not expected to cross the international border." Id. A U.S.
embargo on arms sales to the subcontinent is seen as having hastened the end of the war.
Rizvi, supra note 68, at 70.
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essentially aimed at ending hostilities and restoring the status quo prior
to conflict.75 Interestingly, the Security Council did not renew its call for
a plebiscite, although perhaps this can be explained by India's post-1954
refusal to consider the option. Rather, it requested that India and
Pakistan engage in negotiation and mediation in an attempt to settle the
underlying dispute.76
At the urging of the Soviet Union, negotiators from both countries
met in the Soviet city of Tashkent.77 While India offered numerous
proposals aimed at the resumption of diplomatic relations and
implementation of peace, it would not negotiate on the status of Kashmir;
Pakistan, meanwhile, was only interested in discussing Kashmir. 78 The
Tashkent Declaration required withdrawal of armed forces to their pre-
war positions, reaffirmed observance of the existing cease-fire line,
committed the parties to discourage hostile propaganda, and set forth the
positions of the parties.
Despite third-party mediation, the countries were unable to make
headway. Contrary to hopes, the Tashkent Declaration merely
reestablished the status quo. Reversion to the status quo, though, was
significant in that it not only affirmed the 1949 cease-fire line, but it
treated the line in the same manner as Pakistan's international border
with India. Thus, it has been argued that the cease-fire line began to
acquire a greater legal significance.
8°
The Tashkent meeting was an opportunity for constructive dialogue
between India and Pakistan. This opportunity was, lamentably, passed
by. The outcome of the Tashkent Declaration marked another failure in
resolving the Kashmir issue. Again, inflexibility on the part of both
counties essentially revealed an unwillingness to make concessions in the
interests of long-term peace.
War broke out again in 1971 when Indian forces entered the
territory of East Pakistan on the basis of humanitarian intervention.
Although the majority of fighting took place in East Pakistan, Indian
forces in Kashmir also took the advantage. Although West Pakistan
itself was vulnerable, India declared a unilateral cease-fire, ending the
war. The Indian victory resulted not only in the secession of East
Pakistan, which became Bangladesh, but also in territorial gains in
Kashmir.8'
75. S.C. Res. 210, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., 1238th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/6662 (1965).
76. S.C. Res. 211, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., 1242nd Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/6694 (1965).
77. Khan, supra note 2, at 522.
78. Rizvi, supra note 68, at 70.
79. Tashkent Declaration, Jan. 10, 1966, 560 U.N.T.S. 39.
80. Khan, supra note 2, at 523.
81. RICHARD SISSON & LEO ROSE, WAR AND SECESSION: PAKISTAN, INDIA AND THE
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Pakistan came to the postwar negotiating table in a weak position,
having lost half of its territory and population. With its superior
negotiating stance, India wished to settle its perennial tension with
Pakistan, yet also wanted to ensure the continued existence of the first
democratic government in Pakistan since 1958.2 More importantly,
India wished to eliminate the intrusion of outsiders and establish itself as
a regional superpower by negotiating a strictly bilateral agreement with
Pakistan.
The Simla Agreement was reached on July 2, 1972, and established
a bilateral system for resolution of conflict between the countries. 83 It
required the countries to "settle differences by peaceful means through
bilateral negotiations" and prohibited either country from unilaterally
altering the situation.84 In addition, the 1949 Kashmir cease-fire line was
replaced by a line of control that took into account India's territorial
gains in the 1971 war.85 This line of control was to be honored by both
86sides unless altered by mutual agreement. Finally, the agreement was
recognized as being temporary, with a provision that a "final settlement"
had yet to be reached.87
An attitude of relative cooperation and optimism, the so-called
"spirit of Simla," lasted for several months after the conference. During
this time, relations were normalized to an extent and progress toward a
resolution appeared to be possible. Unfortunately, this spirit did not
endure, and by 1974, relations had returned to their usual dismal state.
Since the 1970s, the stalemate has been accompanied by saber-
rattling, diplomatic posturing, and internal unrest, but no significant
change in the territorial positions of the parties. As former Indian
Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta commented, "for some years, one could
privately observe that Kashmir as an India-Pakistan problem had been
solved with a defacto division along the ceasefire line. '88 Even internal
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conditions within Kashmir were described as content in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.
8 9
This relative tranquility was soon lost as Kashmir again descended
into a chaotic state of terrorism, counter-insurgency and repression in
1989-90. 90 Negotiations have continued, and the bilateral scheme of the
Simla Agreement was reaffirmed in 1997. 91 Despite these efforts,
continual guerrilla warfare has marked the region.92 Blaming Pakistan
for supporting guerrillas, India threatened invasion in November, 2001,
and the countries neared the brink of war again in the summer of 2002.
Perhaps the most alarming complication in Indo-Pakistani relations
since the Simla Agreement has been the development of nuclear weapons
technology by both sides. India first tested a nuclear device in 1974,
although its nuclear weapons program subsequently appeared to be
dormant.94 However, both nations conducted nuclear tests in May 1998
to the surprise of the international community.95 While the development
and use of nuclear weapons present separate legal issues that are not
addressed in this paper, the dangers presented are obvious. 96  Future
conflict between India and Pakistan could yield dire consequences.
IV. Legal Analysis of theConflict
It is unfair - and perhaps simplistic - to say that it is the failure of
the international legal regime that has prevented resolution of the
Kashmir dispute.. It has, however, provided fuel for the continued
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dispute. By narrowly applying legal arguments favorable to its own
interests, either country can defend its own position with some validity.
The scholarly literature on the subject is illustrative; as is typical in a
conflict situation, law, history, and politics can all be plausibly
interpreted (or manipulated, in the eyes of the opposing viewpoint) to
demonstrate the legitimacy of one viewpoint or the other.
Such arguments rarely rely on firmly grounded international law.
Granted, the line between law and politics is often blurred in this context,
but where clear international law exists, it should not be ignored.
Competing passions frequently fail to appreciate the difference between
binding or "hard" international law,97 non-binding "soft" law,98 and non-
legal arguments.
This section will begin by examining the partition as the trigger of
the overt conflict. It will then analyze the validity of the various legal
propositions put forth in the Kashmir discussion. It will demonstrate that
the majority of the legal arguments raised in the past have not been
binding law, but that over-reliance on these arguments has deepened the
conflict. It will explore the political effects of the law and the
consequences of misplaced reliance on the law. It will demonstrate that
these legal and political factors resulted in the entrenchment and
protraction of this conflict.
A. Partition as Trigger of the Conflict
The internal and interstate tensions that have been manifested in the
Kashmir conflict were not caused by the partition of British India in
1947. To suggest so would be to overlook the long and complex history
of the subcontinent prior to the Raj. 99  In addition, divisive
"communalism" was nurtured by the colonial administration. However,
if one event can be considered the trigger that caused the underlying
conflict to become overt, it is the partition.
The negotiations that preceded the partition were extensive, with
both the League and Congress jockeying for the upper hand and the
spectre of partition hanging overhead. Although popular sentiment
97. Law that states have a legal obligation to comply with, such as international
conventions, treaties, and judicial decisions. For a discussion of the sources of
international law, see generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1-31 (4th ed. 1990).
98. Law that states are not bound by, such as resolutions of the U.N. General
Assembly, non-binding Security Council resolutions, and declarations of international
organizations. These sources may be used as evidence to show the existence of binding
international law, however. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 1 I-15.
99. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 502-03 (suggesting that the seeds of religious and
cultural conflict in Kashmir were sown as early as the 14th century).
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existed for partition, revisionists contend that Jinnah did not fully
embrace the idea but merely used the threat of partition as a strategy to
secure concessions from the Congress. 100 In any event, it appears that
neither party was prepared for the sudden British withdrawal,
precipitated by the election of a Labour Government to Westminster. 101
The unilateral withdrawal and partition was an expeditious method
for Britain to disentangle itself and yet leave behind a strong central
government for the majority of the subcontinent. It is ironic that
Britain's commendable goal of decolonization was executed in such an
unfortunate and arguably irresponsible manner.
Would Kashmir have been the center of a half-century-long dispute
between India and Pakistan had Britain definitively settled the territorial
issue? Any answer is speculative. Certainly, conflict would have existed
in Kashmir and may still have erupted into overt internal conflict.
However, it seems that the extent of interstate conflict that has occurred
could have been avoided. As a result, it is fair to conclude that the
politics and territorial division of the partition triggered the interstate
conflict over Kashmir.
B. Legality ofAccession
A legal mechanism was provided for determining the future of the
princely states, but the legal effect of the Instrument of Accession and
the acceptance by Mountbatten on behalf of the Indian government is
debated. It is widely argued that acceptance of the accession by India
was a provisional mechanism to allow Indian military intervention.
10 2
The accession was merely a temporary legal tool utilized to permit
assistance. This point of view relies heavily on the content of
Mountbatten's personal letter to the Maharaja, particularly the statement
that the issue of accession should be referred to the people of Kashmir.
Additional support for the temporary nature of the accession is found in
statements made by Indian Prime Minister Nehru, which indicated his
government's belief that the conditional accession should be affirmed by
a referendum of the Kashmiri people.
10 3
It is also argued that accession should only have been given legal
effect if it was confirmed by a plebiscite. The partition occurred at a
time when the concept of self-determination was gaining acceptance in
100. Asim Roy, The High Politics of India's Partition: The Revisionist Perspective, in
INDIA'S PARTITION: PROCESS STRATEGY AND MOBILIZATION 129 (Mushirul Hasan, ed.,
1993).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Howley, supra note 10, at 95; Khan, supra note 2, at 508; Potter, supra
note 1, at 361; Tremblay, supra note 64, at 481.
103. Howley, supra note 10, at 95; Tremblay, supra note 64, at 481.
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international law, and had been included in the Charter of the United
Nations in 1945.104 Much of the language of the pre-partition debate was
couched in terms of self-determination, and the claims to Kashmir made
after the accession also invoked this doctrine. The manner in which
Kashmir acceded to India has therefore been criticized as violating the
principle of self-determination.
Although these arguments have merit, they are not persuasive. The
accession should be analyzed on two levels: domestic law and
international law. In the domestic context, the Indian Independence Act
was controlling. The Indian Independence Act contained no requirement
of a plebiscite or referendum prior to, or as ratification of, accession by
the ruler of a princely state.' 0 5  It did, however, provide that the
dominions should continue to be governed by the Government of India
Act of 1935.106 This earlier Act provided that "an Indian State shall be
deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor-General has
signified his acceptance of an Instrument of Accession executed by the
Ruler whereby the ruler on behalf of the State declares that he accedes to
the Dominion."' 0 7 Thus, under these two acts, Kashmir became a part of
the Dominion of India upon delivery of the Instrument of Accession and
the formal statement of acceptance by Mountbatten, regardless of
subsequent personal letters or political statements.
Indeed, the accession of over 500 princely states to India and
Pakistan was accomplished by the signing of an instrument of accession
by the ruler and acceptance by the respective dominion. 108 Academic
writings confirm that, though clouded by the conduct of the parties and
the politics of the day, Kashmir acceded to India and became an integral
part of India following acceptance of the Instrument of Accession.'
9
Statements made by members of the Indian government regarding a
Kashmiri plebiscite were unilateral pronouncements made subsequent to,
and having no effect upon, the actual accession of Kashmir into the
Dominion of India under the Act.
Under the international law analysis, the status of the concept of
self-determination must be examined. There is no doubt today that self-
104. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
105. See generally Indian Independence Act, 1947. In spite of the clarity of the Act,
one author simply concludes that, "though there was no mention of provisional accession
in this Instrument of Accession or the formal acceptance, it clearly was part of the
instrument." Howley, supra note 10, at 95.
106. Indian Independence Act § 8(2).
107. Government of India Act, 1935.
108. SarDesai, supra note 4, at 84.
109. See, e.g., MICHEL BRECHER, THE STRUGGLE FOR KASHMIR (1953); Taraknath
Das, The Kashmir Issue and the United Nations, 65 POL. SCI. Q. 264, 268 (1950);
SarDesai, supra note 4, at 84-85.
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determination is a legal norm of international law, 10 and it is arguable
that it has even evolved into customary international law. 111 The doctrine
of inter-temporal law, however, requires that the situation in question
must be analyzed in light of the rules of international law as they existed
at the time.'
12
Thus, the status of self-determination in 1947 must be examined.
Self-determination was mentioned in the U.N. Charter of 1945, but only
in a "limited" manner. 113 Its increase in significance from that time was
gradual. The most important period of its development was the 1960s.
During this time, several important international instruments were
adopted, including the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Territories and Peoples, 14 General Assembly Resolution
1541,115 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1 6 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," 7 and
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the U.N." 8 The latter Declaration, adopted in 1970, is considered to
mark the full evolution of the norm of self-determination into
international law."
9
This review demonstrates that the most important steps toward the
evolution of self-determination into a norm of international law took
place well after the partition. One must conclude, then, that the doctrine
of self-determination did not apply to Kashmir as binding law in 1947.
Therefore, the argument that Kashmir did not legitimately accede to
India cannot rest on this proposition, although application of the
principle of self-determination will be further discussed. 120
110. JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION 149
(2000).
111. Id.at4l.
112. BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 129 (discussing application of the doctrine of inter-
temporal law).
113. CASTELLINO, supra note 110, at 20.
114. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
115. G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
116. 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976).
117. 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1976).
118. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8018
(1970).
119. CASTELLINO, supra note 110, at 34.
120. See infra Part V.A (considering the role of self-determination in resolution of the
conflict).
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C. Legal Force of United Nations Resolutions '
Attempts by the United Nations to mediate the dispute in its early
years reveal several shortcomings.' 2 Clearly, cold-war-era politics made
the Security Council an ineffective forum for resolution of the dispute.
In addition, the United Nations was itself new and untested, and the
impact of its pronouncements was not clear. The year India brought the
issue of Kashmir to the attention of the Security Council was also the
year the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. Although
excitement still surrounded the creation of the U.N., doubts also existed,
and the U.N. did not have the stature and influence it later attained. As a
consequence, both India and Pakistan were able to invoke or deny the
authority of the U.N. to their advantage.
The best example of this has been manipulation of the various U.N.
resolutions, particularly the August 13, 1948, resolution of UNCIP. To
this day accusations are made that the other party is at fault for failing to
fulfill its obligations. Blame is frequently assessed to a state for what it
did or refused to do regarding a specific provision: India faults Pakistan
for not withdrawing its troops, thus impeding progress toward the
plebiscite; Pakistan blames India for refusing to demilitarize and commit
to a plebiscite. This exchange is well documented in - and has been
perpetuated by - literature on the topic.
Such an exchange is obviously not productive and does little to
encourage positive dialogue. What is lost in the discussion is the fact
that these claims are not soundly based on international law. Rather,
they are a futile attempt by each state to ju stify its own position by
pointing to the misconduct of the other.
One cannot ignore the fact that the relevant resolutions of the
Security Council were not binding decisions pursuant to Article 25 of the
U.N. Charter: they were recommendations made under Article 38.122
Nor were the resolutions adopted by UNCIP binding. As UNCIP
member Josef Korbel wrote in 1949, one "had to keep constantly in mind
that [UNCIP] was an agency of good offices having no power to impose
its decisions."'' 23 It cannot be forgotten that the UNCIP resolution of
August 13, 1948, was a proposal that UNCIP itself considered to be
rejected. 24 Thus, all of the diplomatic and academic wrangling over
121. For interesting contemporaneous perspectives on the Kashmir issue in the U.N.,
see generally Michael Brecher, Kashmir: A Case Study in United Nations Mediation, 26
PAC. AFF. 195 (1953); Josef Korbel, The Kashmir Dispute After Six Years, 7 INT'L ORG.
498 (1953).
122. See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 38.
123. Korbel, supra note 42, at 281.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
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which state has prevented its full implementation is somewhat
misguided. Indeed, the conclusion reached in answering such a question
is an academic one, as the legal question is moot.
The lack of binding action by the Security Council is not surprising
given the intense rivalries and suspicions that existed. The competing
interests and prejudices of four of the five permanent members - China,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States -
guaranteed inaction. Several factors made Kashmir particularly
contentious, among them:
1) Kashmir's borders with China and the U.S.S.R.;
2) American interest in forging stronger ties with Pakistan;
3) British involvement in the Past subcontinent; and,
4) American suspicion at India's commitment to the
nonaligned movement.
The U.S. interest in Pakistan and India's relationship with the Soviet
Union ensured veto of any decision prejudicial to either country. As
with other cold war disputes the Security Council was hobbled and no
binding resolutions would be made.
The U.N. involvement in Kashmir, though well intentioned, had
unfortunate consequences. Essentially, the various resolutions of UNCIP
and the Security Council were, at best, soft law that became ammunition
in the war for legitimacy of position. Ultimately, this has resulted in
further entrenchment of the conflict in Kashmir.
D. Consequences of Domestic Law and Politics
The diplomatic and political actions taken by India and Pakistan
since the partition, particularly in domestic legislation, have also
contributed to the confused status of Kashmir. Both nations, in asserting
their claim over the disputed territory, have essentially refused to
acknowledge any potential legitimacy to the other's claim. Enshrining
these claims in domestic legislation has served to reinforce each party's
belief in its own righteousness, perpetuate the other's alienation, and
prevent the issue from moving toward resolution.
The Indian government's decision to make a constitutional claim
over Kashmir and enact the Constituent Assembly has been detrimental
to resolution of the conflict. It cannot be denied that these actions have
served to tighten India's grip on the state. However, the manner in
which they have occurred has cast considerable doubt on India's claim to
Kashmir.
Rather than legitimize the accession of Kashmir to India, the
creation of the Constituent Assembly and adoption of the state
constitution have stood out as glaring attempts to avoid the pitfalls of a
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truly democratic exercise of self-determination. At the same time, they
harden public opinion within India and create an environment in which
any willingness to change the situation is perceived as a concession.
Discussion of legitimate issues is therefore sacrificed, impeding
negotiations regarding ultimate conflict resolution.
On the other hand, Pakistan's decision to enter into a military
alliance with the U.S. at a key moment may have ruined one of the few
chances for the resolution of the conflict in its early years. It marked the
end of any possibility that India would agree to a plebiscite.
Furthermore, it ruined any chance for the development of productive
relations between India and Pakistan. American interference may be
partially blamed, but such a conclusion neglects the true culprits. It is
difficult to deny that potential peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue
was consciously sacrificed by Pakistan's military leadership in favor of
their own ambitions.
E. Bilateral Stalemate
The bilateral negotiations of India and Pakistan have had no more
success than the U.N. in settling their dispute over Kashmir. It has,
however, registered modest success by developing a binding legal regime
between the parties in the form of the Simla Agreement. Although both
sides persist in their claims - for instance, Pakistan still does not accept
the territorial division resulting from the agreement 125 - and sporadic
fighting continues, a territorial status quo has generally been maintained
since 1972.
Perhaps, though, the Simla Agreement has allowed the conflict to
become even more deeply entrenched. Because of the prohibition of
unilateral action and clear binding nature of the agreement, the line of
control assumed the status of a de facto international border. Under the
terms of the agreement neither country can, acting alone, alter the line of
control. Nor can either country invoke international mediation or rely on
third-party intervention. Because of the insistence on strict bilateralism,
the line of control can only be changed if both countries consent.
Taking a strict legal view, the situation might never change so long
as one of the countries refuses to agree. Thus, the bilateral provision of
the agreement creates, potentially, a perpetual stalemate in which no
other country or organization can interfere. At a time when the U.N.
may finally be equipped to deal with the Kashmir issue effectively, either
party can invoke the Simla Agreement to insist that third-party
involvement is unwarranted.
125. See Makeig, supra note 5, at 283.
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V. The Role of International Law in Conflict Resolution
Part IV explored the triggering and entrenchment of the interstate
conflict over Kashmir. It suggested that the conflict has been
perpetuated, rather than resolved, through the use of international law.
Despite this, principles of international law and the international system
should be at the center of any future attempt to bring peace and stability
to the region.
This section will demonstrate the importance of these institutions in
the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It will examine the roles of the
following in resolution:
1) The doctrine of self-determination;
2) The Simla Agreement;
3) U.N. action; and,
4) Interstate cooperation.
Finally, it will suggest that these factors together offer the possibility of a
final resolution for Kashmir.
A. Self-determination
Self-determination, in its most basic sense, consists of freedom from
foreign domination and the ability to determine one's own political
future.'26 As discussed above, self-determination can now be considered
a norm of international law. 127 Thus, the doctrine of self-determination
must play a central part in any plan for the peaceful future of Kashmir.
It can be argued that the first part of self-determination - freedom
from foreign domination - was fulfilled by the withdrawal of the British
from Kashmir in 1947. Of course, nationalists from both sides, as well
as advocates for ' Kashmiri independence, would assert that this has not
yet happened. Without disputing these claims, it can still be said that
1947 saw the end of salt-water colonialism,128 marking an important step
toward self-determination.
The real focus of self-determination in Kashmir is on the political
future of the state. Valid claims exist in favor of possession by both
India and Pakistan, and the possibility of independence or a power-
sharing agreement cannot be discounted, either. It seems, then, that the
will of the people must be ascertained in order to determine the preferred
arrangement.
As with many self-determination cases, determining who should
126. CASTELLINO, supra note 110, at 149.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 110-19.
128. This term refers to classic overseas colonization, generally by European powers.
See CASTELLINO, supra note 110, at 65.
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exercise the right is a difficult question. It has been' suggested that the
right to self-determination should be exercised by the people of the entire
state, the people of each region, or only by the people of the Kashmir
Valley. 129  Determining the correct group of people is further
complicated by the changing demographics resulting from political
upheaval. 130
It is entirely possible that a geographically limited exercise in self-
determination might impact the traditional borders of Kashmir. Changes
to the boundaries could conflict with the doctrine of uti possidetis, which
states that the colonial boundaries should be maintained upon
decolonization. 131 Under this doctrine, any alteration to the colonial
boundary must be justified by acceptable evidence. 132 Ironically, it is
suggested that the undoing of colonial boundaries during the partition of
the subcontinent contributed to application of the doctrine of uti
possidetis in Africa in the 1960s.
133
There are not clear answers to these questions under international
law. It is important, though, that they are addressed. The issues must be
definitively dealt with as part of any final agreement on Kashmir's
future.
B. The Simla Agreement
The Simla Agreement will be a factor in any future negotiations
between India and Pakistan. Because of its strict requirement of
bilateralism, the Agreement has been viewed as a roadblock preventing
any real progress.1 34 Historically, this assessment has been true, with the
Agreement allowing either country to veto any change to the status quo.
Of course, direct, bilateral negotiations eliminate possible
interference and allow for an agreed plan of action, rather than one
forced upon India and Pakistan by outside parties. This is certainly the
preferable method for determining such issues as who should exercise
the right to self-determination. A role may exist for the international
community, if India and Pakistan agree. With willing parties, the Simla
Agreement could provide a workable framework toward resolution of the
Kashmir issue.
The parties, however, have been unwilling and the Simla
129. See Khan, supra note 2, at 533 (advocating a plebiscite only for the Kashmir
Valley).
130. See, e.g., Das, supra note 109, at 270 (describing significant change in
population between 1941 and 1948).
131. CASTELLINO, supra note 110, at 110.
132. Id. at 142.
133. Rehman, supra note 9, at 459.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
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Agreement has yielded little progress. Still, by its terms the Agreement
commits India and Pakistan to eventual settlement of the Kashmir issue
through meetings. 35 It is likely that international pressure will have to
come to bear on the parties for real progress to be made; the Agreement
ensures, however, that the parties have the opportunity to reach a mutual
agreement.
Should the Agreement continue to prove unworkable, two
possibilities exist. First, India and Pakistan could decide to enter into a
superseding agreement that offers better chances at eventual settlement.
Second, the U.N. could resolve to take binding action to bring a final
settlement to the issue.
C. United Nations Action
As discussed above, U.N. attempts to mediate the Kashmir dispute
proved unsuccessful. 136 The reasons for the lack of success have been
primarily attributed to cold-war politics and the resulting inability of the
U.N. to take binding action on the issue. This past disappointment,
though, is no reason to discount the potential for the U.N. to play a useful
role in any future settlement.
There are three primary roles the U.N. will play in settlement of the
issue. First, the U.N. is the obvious organization to apply continued
pressure on India and Pakistan to resolve the dispute bilaterally under the
Simla Agreement. By respecting the bilateral terms of the Agreement
but actively encouraging dialogue between the countries, the U.N. can
help avoid the suspicions of the past, particularly from India.
37
Second, organs of the U.N. should indicate their continued
willingness to play an active role in mediation or negotiation of a
settlement. The U.N. should be careful not to force itself on the situation
so long as progress is being made. However, it should also make it clear
that if the parties mutually agree, an existing organ or special
commission of the U.N. would be available to facilitate settlement.
Finally, the U.N. may be forced to assert its responsibilities to
maintain world peace and stability. 38 Although it should respect the
current bilateral regime, the U.N. must be ready to take such action as is
necessary if the situation again becomes openly hostile. In this case, past
experience has taught that the Security Council must take firm and
135. Simla Agreement, supra note 83, at art. VI.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 33-54, 121-24.
137. The U.N. recently declined to intervene in Indo-Pakistani relations, citing the
bilateral nature of the issues. U.N. Rejects Pakistan's Request to Intervene, TIMES OF
INDIA, January 10, 2002.
138. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1.
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binding action. While this presupposes a certain amount of unity among
the members of the Security Council, particularly among the permanent
members, the chances of such a consensus are far greater today than
during the cold war era.
D. Interstate Cooperation
It seems very simplistic to say that interstate cooperation is a key to
final settlement of the Kashmir issue; had India and Pakistan been able to
cooperate there would likely be no issue to discuss. Nonetheless, a
cooperative approach may prove to be the only means by which India
and Pakistan can reach an agreement that will prove satisfactory to all,
including the people of Kashmir. While a detailed plan for cooperative
action would be of significant scale, 139 a few points can be set out here.
First, it is essential that political leaders in both India and Pakistan
put their desire for a settlement before any short-term political goals.
Use of the dispute as a political rallying point would have to end.'
40
Only if this could be accomplished would there be hope of settlement
under the Simla Agreement. If not, it seems likely that settlement would
only occur if imposed from the outside or if it resulted from another
military confrontation.
To a certain extent this would require abandoning long-standing
claims of being in the right. For example, India's conduct in acquiring
the princely state of Junagadh is frequently mentioned in academic
literature on the Kashmir dispute.' 4' Although it might be relevant to
events at the time of the partition, it does not contribute anything positive
to the discussion of the future of Kashmir.
A useful example for a negotiated settlement in Kashmir is the
Belfast Agreement.142 The Agreement was concluded on April 10, 1998,
between the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of
Ireland. Appended to the treaty was an agreement entered into by all of
the region's major political powers. The agreement was essentially a
framework providing the structure for more detailed treatment of
difficult issues such as self-determination, policing, and
decommissioning of weapons.
43
139. For a plan for regional cooperation within Kashmir, see generally Khan, supra
note 2.
140. See Mehta, supra note 88, at 393 (describing the political posturing of both
governments at the onset of the 1989 hostilities).
141. See, e.g., Howley, supra note 10, at 96; Khan, supra note 2, at 510.
142. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, April 10, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 751
(commonly known as the Belfast Agreement or Good Friday Agreement).
143. Id.
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Such an approach might be suited to Kashmir, where there has been
great difficulty in reaching agreement because of political sensitivities
and competing interests. Such an agreement could certainly be
accomplished within the constraints of the Simla Agreement. The
concerns of the parties to the agreement would, in fact, be paramount.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has examined the genesis of the Kashmir dispute and the
subsequent entrenchment of the conflict. The partition of 1947 has been
identified as the trigger of the conflict. It has been suggested that the
approach of the international community, due to political interests and
the failure to take binding action, contributed to this process. Legal
arguments based on "soft" law have also compounded the problem by
allowing each side to focus its attention on the misdeeds of the other.
Meanwhile, the unilateral actions of both countries have frequently
moved them further away from agreement.
Despite these difficulties, negotiation and international law offer the
best opportunity for final settlement of the dispute. Taking into account
the principle of self-determination, the parties should work bilaterally
toward an agreed resolution with the assistance and urging of the
international community. Cooperation between India and Pakistan will
be the key in bringing long-term stability to this volatile region.
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